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I. Introduction
In order to qualify as a refugee, an asylum seeker must
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of at
least one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group
(“PSG”).1 This definition in the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) reflects the international definition of a refugee in the U.N.

† Fatma E. Marouf (B.A., Yale University; J.D., M.P.H., Harvard University) is a
Professor of Law and Director of the Immigrant Rights Clinic at Texas A&M University
School of Law. This Article draws on ideas and arguments developed during the federal
litigation challenging Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189 (BIA
2018). Deepest thanks to my co-counsel and amici in that case, including Zachary
Albun, Jean-Claude Andre, Deborah Anker, Jeffrey Chase, Geoffrey Hoffman, Andrea
Meza, and Monique Sherman.
1 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2014).
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Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“Refugee Convention”).2 Among the five grounds, membership in
a particular social group (“PSG”) has created the most confusion.
The U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals initially approached
interpreting the PSG ground in a manner consistent with the other
four grounds.3 Recent administrative decisions issued under the
Trump Administration, however, have imposed uniquely strict
requirements for claims based on the PSG ground, rather than
striving for consistency across the five grounds.4 This trend
disproportionately disadvantages women and children asylum
seekers fleeing violence by private actors who tend to rely on the
PSG ground.5 In fact, the constrictions of the PSG ground may be
specifically targeted at curbing asylum claims by women and
children fleeing Central America.6
Part I of this Article provides a brief background about the
evolution of the PSG ground in the United States and how it has
become increasingly complicated and constricted over time. Part II
discusses several ways that recent administrative decisions have
imposed uniquely strict requirements for PSG-based asylum claims,
both procedurally and substantively. Namely, the recent decision
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in Matter of W-Y-C& H-O-B- creates two new procedural restrictions. First, it imposes
an exceedingly strict pleading standard in PSG cases by requiring
“exact delineation” of the PSG.7 Second, Matter of W-Y-Cprohibits asylum seekers from revising their PSG in an
administrative appeal, departing from longstanding practice.8 At
the same time, the Attorney General’s recent decision in Matter of
A-B- imposes two significant substantive restrictions.9 It purports

2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267.
3 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
4 See Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Rejecting the Children of Violence: Why U.S.
Asylum Law Should Return to the Acosta Definition of “a Particular Social Group,” 30
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 287, 287 (2016).
5 Id.
6 See id.
7 Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018).
8 Id.
9 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (A.G. 2018).
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to exclude entire categories of claims from the PSG ground.10
Additionally, it imposes a heightened legal standard for showing
persecution by non-governmental actors, which is especially
common in gender-related cases brought under the PSG ground.11
Part III explores the significant implications of these recent
developments.
II. The Evolution of the PSG Ground in U.S. Asylum
Jurisprudence
The BIA first interpreted the PSG ground in 1985 in the seminal
case Matter of Acosta, which applied the statutory construction
principle of ejusdem generis to define a PSG consistently with the
four other protected grounds.12 Reasoning that the other four
grounds for asylum (race, nationality, religion, and political
opinion) all involved an immutable characteristic—something that
a person cannot or should not have to change because it is
fundamental to identity—the BIA applied that same definition to
membership in a PSG.13 For two decades, Acosta’s interpretation
of a PSG based on an “immutable characteristic” remained
definitive. Under Acosta, the BIA recognized many types of PSGs,
including, but not limited to, those based on sexual orientation, past
employment, tribe, and family.14
Beginning in 2006, however, the BIA began to revise the
definition of a PSG.15 Between 2006 and 2014, the BIA issued eight
precedent decisions addressing the PSG ground.16 In 2006 and
2008, the BIA introduced the concepts of “social visibility” and

Id.
Id. at 317–19.
12 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
13 Id. at 233–34.
14 Id. at 233.
15 See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining
a Particular Social Group and its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual
Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 63 (2008).
16 See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 (BIA 2006); Matter of A-M-E- & JG-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 69 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 597, 597 (BIA
2008); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 591 (BIA 2008); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (BIA
2014), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Garay-Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018); Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388
(BIA 2014).
10
11
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“particularity” into the PSG analysis, first as factors and then as
requirements.17 All the while, the BIA denied that these new
requirements departed from prior decisions and practice, and
instead claimed that they had applied the same principles.18
Because the BIA failed to explain clearly what it meant by the terms
“social visibility” and “particularity,” much confusion resulted and
the new requirements were challenged in the appellate courts. In
2009 and 2011 respectively, the Seventh and Third Circuits rejected
them as unreasonable under a Chevron analysis.19
Eventually, in 2014, the BIA issued two precedent decisions,
Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, attempting to clarify the
new requirements.20 These decisions renamed “social visibility” as
“social distinction,” explaining that ocular visibility was not
required.21 Rather, the group has to be seen as distinct by the rest
of society.22 The BIA also explained that “particularity” referred to
whether the group in question has clear boundaries, so that one can
determine if someone is in or out of the group.23 While the Third
Circuit ultimately accepted the “social distinction” and
“particularity” requirements in 2018, those elements have not been
applied in the Seventh Circuit.24
Despite the BIA’s efforts to clarify the meanings of social
distinction and particularity, they remain confusing even for

17 Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 (BIA 2006); Matter of A-M-E- & J-GU-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 69 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 579 (BIA
2008); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 591 (BIA 2008).
18 Some circuit courts accepted the BIA’s position. See, e.g., Hernandez de la Cruz
v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 784, 786–87 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that Board’s decision in M-EV-G- clarified but did not depart from principles in prior cases).
19 See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 611 (7th Cir. 2009); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 582 (3d Cir. 2011). In 2018, the Third Circuit ultimately
accepted the particularity and social distinction requirements after the BIA’s clarifications.
See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 535 (3d Cir. 2018).
20 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (BIA 2014), aff’d in relevant part sub nom; Garay-Reyes v. Lynch,
842 F.3d 1125, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018).
21 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 227; Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at
208.
22 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238.
23 Id. at 239.
24 See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d at 611. In 2018, the Third Circuit ultimately
accepted the particularity and social distinction requirements after the BIA’s clarifications.
See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d at 535.
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attorneys and are almost impossible for unrepresented asylum
seekers to understand.25 One reason for the persistent confusion is
that the BIA’s various explanations have been contradictory. For
example, the BIA has defined “particularity” to mean that a group
has “definable boundaries,” but it has also rejected groups with clear
boundaries on the basis that the group is too broad.26 Similarly, the
BIA held that social distinction is based on the view of society as a
whole, but in maintaining that previously recognized PSGs satisfied
this standard, it relied on the perspective of the persecutors.27
Former Attorney General Sessions added to this confusion in Matter
of A-B-, by rejecting the BIA’s analysis of particularity and social
distinction in Matter of A-R-C-G-.28 In A-B-, Sessions stated that
even if “each term [in the PSG] has a commonly understood
definition,” that “does not establish that these terms have the
requisite particularity in identifying a distinct social group.”29
However, the Attorney General failed to explain what would
provide a clear benchmark for who falls within the group.
Additionally, the difference between “social distinction” and
“particularity” remains unclear. In Valdiviezo-Galdamez, the Third
Circuit noted that it was “hard-pressed to discern any difference”
between the requirements.30 Part of the confusion is that the BIA
and Attorney General have defined both factors by referencing
societal perceptions of discreteness and distinction.31 The two

25 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (acknowledging that the social
distinction and particularity requirements may overlap); Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123,
1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing membership in a particular social group as “an enigmatic
and difficult-to-define term”); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 647 (10th Cir.
2012) (noting “the evolving boundaries of social group membership”); see also DEBORAH
ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM §5:40–43 (Thompson Reuters ed., 2018).
26 See, e.g., Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 221 (finding that the proposed
group of “former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their
gang membership” was not particular because it “could include persons of any age, sex, or
background”); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239 (stating that a PSG must not be
“overbroad”).
27 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 218–19.
28 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335–36 (A.G. 2018) (overruling Matter of
A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
29 Id. at 335.
30 Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011).
31 See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216; Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at
335 (reasoning that social groups based on resistance to gang violence likely lack
particularity because they “possess no distinguishing characteristic or concrete trait that
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requirements also often conflict with each other, such that satisfying
one undermines the other. The Attorney General acknowledged this
tension in Matter of A-B-, stating that “[PSG] definitions that seek
to avoid particularity issues by defining a narrow class . . . will often
lack sufficient social distinction to be cognizable as a distinct social
group, rather than a description of individuals sharing certain traits
or experiences.”32 Thus, asylum seekers are often trapped between
trying to avoid a PSG that is “too broad to have definable
boundaries” and one that is “too narrow to have larger significance
in society.”33
The social distinction and particularity requirements not only
create a bewildering legal standard but also impose an incredibly
high evidentiary burden. Satisfying these requirements generally
requires submitting voluminous country conditions documents,
which unrepresented detainees cannot obtain. In addition, expert
testimony is often required. Many detainees cannot afford counsel,
much less have the wherewithal for an expert to testify on their
behalf.
It also remains unclear what type of evidence actually
establishes the requirements. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA relied
on country conditions evidence that Guatemala has a “culture of
machismo and family violence,” and that police often fail to respond
to requests for assistance related to domestic violence. Based on
this, the BIA found that the group defined as “married women who
are unable to leave the relationship” is socially distinct.34 However,
former Attorney General Sessions found that same evidence
inadequate in Matter of A-B-.35 Without explaining what type of
evidence would establish social distinction, Sessions speculated that
each victim of domestic violence is viewed “as a victim of a
particular abuser in highly individualized circumstances” rather
than as any type of group.36 This leaves asylum seekers with little
practical guidance about how to establish that a group satisfies the
particularity and social distinction requirements.
would identify them as members of such a group,” which sounds more like an analysis of
social distinction).
32 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336.
33 Id.
34 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 394.
35 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336.
36 Id.
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III. Recent Developments Constricting the PSG Ground
The recent decision in Matter of W-Y-C- imposes two new
procedural restrictions on the PSG ground, while Matter of A-Bcreates two new substantive restrictions. As discussed below,
Matter of W-Y-C- imposes an extremely high pleading standard
unlike any other by requiring an “exact delineation” of the PSG. At
the same time, it prohibits applicants from revising the definition of
PSG at the administrative level. Meanwhile, Matter of A-Bpurports to restrict entire categories of PSG-based asylum claims,
while also imposing a higher legal standard for persecution by nongovernmental actors.
A. Procedural Constrictions
1. Imposing an Exceedingly Strict Pleading Standard for
PSG Claims
Pleading rules are supposed to play a “gatekeeping” function by
allowing courts to get rid of meritless cases quickly, thereby
reducing litigation costs and promoting judicial efficiency.37 If a
pleading standard is too strict, however, it may also exclude cases
with merit before relevant information can come to light.
Furthermore, at least one empirical study has found that heightened
pleading standards do not actually do a better job of filtering out
meritless lawsuits.38
The BIA’s decision in Matter of W-Y-C- imposes an extremely
strict pleading standard. It singles out asylum cases based on the
PSG ground as an area where the litigant must provide an “exact
delineation” of a claim to avoid waiver.39 This “exact delineation”
standard is not applied in any other area of law, or to any other type
of asylum case.40 Asylum seekers whose cases are based on religion
or political opinion are not required to provide an “exact

37 Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 INDIAN L.J. 119, 123–
24 (2011).
38 Id. at 125–26 (finding that the heightened “plausibility” pleading standard does
not do better than the notice pleading standard for filtering out meritless claims in federal
civil litigation).
39 Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018).
40 See note 42 below and accompanying text (explaining that courts traditionally
require a litigant to “adequately raise” an issue, not provide an “exact delineation”).
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delineation” of their claim.41
The traditional legal standard to avoid waiver of a claim is that
the litigant must “adequately raise” an issue below. This is true even
in the Fifth Circuit where W-Y-C- arose. For example, the Fifth
Circuit has explained, “For this court to have jurisdiction over an
issue that the BIA has adequate means of addressing, a petitioner
must adequately raise that issue before the BIA.”42 In Eduard v.
Ashcroft, the Fifth Circuit found that a petitioner had “adequately
raised” a claim under the Convention Against Torture even though
he never explicitly stated that he was applying for that form of relief
and did not check the box for it on the application form.43 Similarly,
in Hongyok v. Gonzales, the court allowed the petitioner to present
a PSG that did not “significantly differ” from the one presented to
the Board, reasoning that she had “adequately presented” her
proposed ground for relief to the agency.44 Requiring an asylum
seeker to provide an “exact delineation” of a PSG is a much stricter
standard than simply requiring the applicant to “adequately raise”
the claim. In other contexts, federal courts have also applied the
“adequately raise” standard for preserving a claim.45 Indeed, in no
area of law is “exact delineation” the pleading standard.
The rigidity of the “exact delineation” requirement is also at
odds with congressional intent. The INA makes it clear that asylum
is not supposed to be an exclusionary process by giving immigration
41 Matter of W-Y-C- applies only to the PSG ground, and no other cases mention
“exact delineation” as a standard in asylum cases.
42 Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 424 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also
Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that the petitioner had
“adequately raised” the argument that his conviction did not trigger the stop-time rule for
cancellation of removal); see also Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 577 n.6 (10th
Cir. 2017) (declining to address an argument that the petitioner “did not adequately raise
to the BIA”); Garcia-Gonzalez v. Holder, 737 F.3d 498, 501 n.3 (8th Cir. 2013) (“An alien
has not adequately raised an issue before the BIA if he does not address it in his briefing
before the BIA.”).
43 Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 195 (5th Cir. 2004).
44 Hongyok v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 70 F. App’x 212, 213 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Because
Garza did not adequately raise the issue of whether the activation of the overhead lights
on the Border Patrol vehicle after Garza stopped his vehicle constituted a seizure in his
motion to suppress before the district court, he has waived this argument”) (emphasis
added); Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding, in a habeas case, that
the procedural default and exhaustion doctrine objections were waived, because the
petitioner “did indeed adequately raise his hearsay arguments through his state court
proceedings”) (emphasis added).
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judges (“IJs”) an affirmative obligation to develop the record.46
Likewise, the regulations require IJs to advise noncitizens about
their “apparent eligibility” to apply for any benefits in the INA.47
The new “exact delineation” standard conflicts with this
collaborative approach. Courts have found that an IJ’s failure to
advise a noncitizen of “apparent eligibility” to apply for relief is a
due process violation.48 Furthermore, the BIA has explained that
although the burden of proof is ultimately on the respondent, the IJ
should take an active role in helping the respondent develop her
legal theory from the facts presented.49
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also
stressed that “the adjudicator shares the duty to ascertain and
evaluate all the relevant facts,” noting that “[t]his is achieved, to a
large extent, by the adjudicator . . . guiding the applicant in
providing the relevant information.”50 While W-Y-C- assumes that
every asylum applicant should be able to define her PSG perfectly,
UNHCR recognizes that “[o]ften the applicant himself may not be
aware of the reasons for the persecution feared.”51 It is not,
however, his duty to analyze the case to such an extent as to identify

46 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1241(b)(3)(A), 1641(b)(1); see also Sankoh v.
Mukasey, 539 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Unlike Article III courts, an immigration
court is a more inquisitorial tribunal.”).
47 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(a)(2).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc); Toure v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 443 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2006) (“an [immigration
judge] has a duty to develop an applicant’s testimony, especially regarding an issue that
she may find dispositive”); Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he IJ
must adequately explain the hearing procedures to the alien, including what he must prove
to establish his basis for relief.”).
49 See Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723–24 (BIA 1997) (recognizing the
responsibility of the immigration judge to ensure that refugee protection is provided when
warranted, and specifying that a “cooperative approach” between the immigration judge
and the applicant is therefore necessary in immigration court); see also Matter of Y-L-, 24
I. & N. Dec. 151, 161 (BIA 2007) (admonishing the immigration judge for failing to notify
an asylum applicant of her concerns with the application and providing the applicant with
an opportunity to respond).
50 U.N. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on
Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims (Dec. 16, 1998).
51 UNHCR, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3, 15–16 [hereinafter
UNCHR
HANDBOOK],
available
at
https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/handbook-procedures-criteriadetermining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [https://perma.cc/8CFX-DJGV].

496

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLIV

the reasons in detail.”52 According to UNHCR, “it is for the
examiner, when investigating the facts of the case, to ascertain the
reason or reasons for the persecution feared and to decide whether
the definition in the 1951 Convention it met within this respect.”53
Although the BIA’s decision in W-Y-C- quotes an earlier
decision, Matter of A-T-, as setting forth the “exact delineation”
requirement—suggesting that this has been the standard for over a
decade—the language in A-T- was mere dicta in remand instructions
and did not set forth a general rule. In its initial 2007 decision in
Matter of A-T-, the BIA found that a woman from Mali who had
suffered female genital mutilation had failed to establish a risk of
future persecution because there was no chance she would be
persecuted again by the same procedure.54 The BIA noted that in a
prior motion to reconsider, the applicant had “presented a much
broader group in arguing that FGM was only one aspect in the
lifelong subjugation of women in her culture.”55 The BIA did not
refuse to consider the group, but instead found that the record in the
case did not support that claim.56
The Attorney General vacated that decision in 2008, concluding
that the BIA had erred in denying the application because the feared
future persecution could not “take precisely the same form as past
persecution.”57 The Attorney General instructed the BIA to
determine whether the past FGM triggered a presumption of a
continuing threat to the applicant’s life or freedom on account of her
membership in a particular social group.58 In a footnote, the
Attorney General remarked, “[i]n most cases of this sort, it would
be better practice for Immigration Judges and the Board to address
at the outset whether the applicant has established persecution on
account of membership in a particular social group, rather than
assuming it as the Board did here.”59 This language clearly reflects

Id.
53 Id.; see also American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A
Need for Harmony in the Face of a Refugee Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1399 (2018)
(arguing that U.S. courts should defer to UNHCR in interpreting the Refugee Convention).
54 Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 296–97 (BIA 2007).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 621.
58 Id. at 622.
59 Id. at 623 n.7.
52
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a recommendation, not a rule. Furthermore, the decision states the
applicant “must initially identify the particular social group or
groups in which membership is claimed,” not provide an exact
delineation of the group.60
In 2009, after the case was remanded to the BIA, the BIA issued
another published decision in Matter of A-T-.61 That decision
provides “[b]ecause the matter was not consistently presented
below, the DHS requests that on remand the respondent specifically
delineate the particular social group(s) [to which] she claims to
belong.”62 DHS requested the respondent to provide other
information as well, such as whether she was invoking any other
grounds for asylum, and the identity of her past persecutor.63 In
instructing the respondent to provide an “exact delineation” of her
PSG on remand, the Board stressed “this is an issue that has not
been consistently presented by the respondent in these proceedings,
and this alone precludes us from resolving her case on the record
now before us.”64 Thus, the BIA never suggested that all applicants
relying on the PSG ground should be required to provide an exact
delineation of the PSG. Rather, its remand instructions were highly
specific to the facts and history of the case. Exact delineation was
important in A-T- because the agency was trying to determine
whether the applicant’s “fear of forced marriage [was] on account
of the same enumerated ground as [her] past persecution.”65 A-Tdid not establish a general rule requiring all asylum seekers to
provide an exact delineation of the PSG.
Recent changes in how IJs are handling cases post W-Y-C- show
that W-Y-C- is the case that changed the rules, not the BIA’s 2009
decision in A-T-. Relying on Matter of W-Y-C, some IJs have been
issuing orders stylized as “summary judgments” and denying
asylum early on in the proceedings without even giving the
applicant an evidentiary hearing, based on the applicant’s failure to
provide an exact delineation of the PSG.66 As former Immigration
Judge Jeffrey S. Chase has explained, such “summary denials” are
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Matter of A-T-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 4, 4 (BIA 2009).
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
See id. at 10 n.6.
Summary judgment forms are on file with author.
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a predictable by-product of a rule requiring “exact delineation.”67
There is no evidence of immigration judges pretermitting asylum
claims based on other protected grounds; only PSG-based asylum
claims are being denied without an evidentiary hearing or any
opportunity to testify.
Decisions issued by former Attorney General Sessions shortly
before the BIA’s decision in W-Y-C- paved the way for these
summary dismissals. In E-F-H-L-, Sessions vacated a Board
decision recognizing the right to a full asylum hearing.68 Shortly
thereafter, in Castro-Tum, Sessions stressed the importance of
expeditious processing.69 Similarly, in Matter of L-A-B-R-, which
dealt with continuances, Sessions stressed the “efficient
enforcement of the immigration laws.”70 These decisions all
prioritize speed in decision-making at the expense of a fair process.
Immigration judges who are pretermitting PSG-based asylum
cases without a full hearing may be violating longstanding agency
requirements and constitutional due process norms. In a 1989
decision called Matter of Fefe, the BIA stressed that full
examination of the applicant is “an essential aspect of the asylum
adjudication.”71 There, the BIA cited the UNHCR Handbook,
which recognizes that testimony (a personal interview in the context
of refugee status determinations), rather than simply written
materials, is required to properly assess a claim for refugee status.72
The Supreme Court has recognized that the UNHCR Handbook
provides “significant guidance in constructing the United Nations
Protocol . . . to which Congress sought to conform United States
refugee law.”73

67 See Jeffrey S. Chase, Are Summary Denials Coming to Immigration Court?,
JEFFREYSCHASE.COM
(June
24,
2018),
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/24/are-summary-denials-coming-toimmigration-court [https://perma.cc/FGU8-8TA4]; Jeffrey S. Chase, The Impact of the
BIA’s Decision in Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, JEFFREYSCHASE.COM (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/1/26/0sg8ru1tl0gz4becqimcrtt4ns8yjz
[https://perma.cc/WH4R-Y88U].
68 Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018).
69 See Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 293 (A.G. 2018); Matter of L-AB-R- et al., 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 406–07 (A.G. 2018).
70 See Matter of L-A-B-R- et al., 27 I. & N. at 407.
71 Matter of Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 117–18 (BIA 1989).
72 Id. at 118 (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at ¶ 199–200.
73 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439–40 n.22 (1987).
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When the Supreme Court raised the pleading standard for
federal civil litigation from “notice” pleading to “plausibility” in
Iqbal and Twombly, commentators criticized the change for
foreclosing certain classes of plaintiffs from relief,74 creating
“disarray,”75 introducing unpredictability into the process of pretrial
disposition for all types of claims,76 reflecting “procedural judicial
activism,”77 and violating procedural due process rights by
imposing a pleading standard that is difficult for laypeople to
satisfy.78 One commentator claimed that Iqbal “may be one of the
most infamous and harmful [decisions] to . . . individual rights of
this generation.”79
Similar critiques can be made of the new “exact delineation”
standard for PSG-based asylum claims. Appellate courts will likely
soon have to address whether this is an appropriate pleading
standard, especially as more cases of asylum claims being
pretermitted without an evidentiary hearing come to light. Courts
should reject this new pleading standard as an arbitrary departure
from precedent that conflicts with all other pleading standards. A
74 See, e.g., David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 426 (2010); see Alex Reinert,
Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78
UMKC L. REV. 931, 940–41 (2010).
75 Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 192 (2010) (“Iqbal
ha[s] left the requirements for pleading intentional employment-discrimination claims in
disarray . . . .”).
76 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010) (criticizing Iqbal for “fix[ing] on a novel and
unpredictable test”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: Transcript of
the 2010 Honorable James R. Browning Distinguished Lecture in Law, 71 MONT. L. REV.
285, 291 (2010) (describing the Iqbal standard as “mean [ing] . . . that it all depends on the
luck of the draw and who your district judge is”); Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of
Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951,
953 (2010) (noting “the unbounded discretion that the opinion grants to judges . . . .”).
77 See generally Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and Procedural Judicial Activism,
37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 901–907 (2010) (addressing problems posed by the Pearson Iqbal
interaction, specifically and the curtailment of remedy availability in civil litigation).
78 Melodee C. Rhodes, The Battle Lines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
and the Effects on a Pro Se Litigant’s Inability to Survive a Motion to Dismiss, 22 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 527, 529 (2010) (arguing that under Iqbal, FRCP 8(a)(2) “violates an
individual’s procedural due process rights by requiring a pleading standard that a
layperson finds difficult to satisfy”).
79 Darwinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest
Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58
BUFF. L. REV. 419, 423 (2010).
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recent Fifth Circuit precedent affirmed the BIA’s decision in Matter
of W-Y-C-, but a concurring opinion by Judge Dennis rejected the
“exact delineation” standard as “exacting and unnecessary.”80
Recognizing that “[d]efining a PSG is unspeakably complex and the
requirements ever-changing,” Judge Dennis concluded that
“[s]omeone who faces persecution on account of a protected ground
is no less deserving of asylum’s protections because of her inability
to delineate a convoluted legal concept.”81 The “exact delineation”
standard does not weed out meritless claims and protect judicial
efficiency. Rather, it unfairly disadvantages particular classes of
asylum seekers whose claims happen to be based on the most
perplexing and unpredictable ground for asylum.
2. Prohibiting Revision or Clarification of the PSG at
the Administrative Level
The second way that Matter of W-Y-C- restricts PSG-based
asylum claims is by prohibiting revision of the PSG definition at the
administrative level. This new rule conflicts with the BIA’s
longstanding practice of reviewing revised PSGs, and even revising
them itself, based on an existing evidentiary record.82 In Matter of
W-Y-C-, the BIA reasoned its role as an appellate body that cannot
make factual findings in the first instance prevented it from
reviewing a revised PSG, explaining that “[a] determination
whether a social group is cognizable is a fact-based inquiry” and
stressing the “inherently factual nature of the social group
analysis.”83 At the same time, however, the BIA acknowledged that
it “review[s] the ultimate determination whether a proposed group
is cognizable de novo.”84 Federal appellate court decisions confirm
that the question of whether a PSG is cognizable is a legal question
that the BIA reviews de novo.85 Yet the subsidiary elements of

80

Cantarero-Lagos v. Barr, 2019 WL 1986920 at *6 (5th Cir. 2019) (Dennis, J.,
concurring).
81
Id.
82 See generally Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996) (allowing both
parties to reform on appeal).
83 Matter of W-Y-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018) (quoting Matter of L-EA-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42 (BIA 2017)).
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Hernandez-De La Cruz v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 784, 786 (5th Cir. 2016)
(“Petitioner’s challenge to the determination that ‘former informants’ do not constitute a
‘particular social group’ is a legal question that we have jurisdiction to review”); Hongyok
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immutability, social distinction, and particularity, as well as
membership in the group and nexus (the connection between the
PSG and the persecution), are all factual findings.
The question then becomes whether the BIA can determine
whether a PSG is cognizable when an IJ has not made the subsidiary
findings about the PSG. The Eighth Circuit recently explained that
while immutability, particularity, and social distinction are
necessary elements to a particular social group, the analysis “does
not require the immigration judge to make findings on each
element.”86 There, the IJ rejected the PSG without addressing any
of the specific elements.87 Despite having no findings on these
elements from the IJ, the BIA ruled that the PSG lacked
particularity.88 In that case, the BIA was able to assess particularity
on its own, and the Eighth Circuit denied Mayorga-Rosa’s petition
for review.89 If the BIA does not need to review factual findings
made by the IJ on each of the elements, then it should be able to
determine if a reformulated PSG is cognizable de novo based on an
existing record.
Additionally, if the original PSG presented to the IJ and the
revised PSG presented to the BIA are substantially similar, then the
IJ’s findings on the subsidiary elements may apply equally to the
revised PSG. This raises the potentially tricky question of how to
determine whether two groups are substantially similar. In the case
of W-Y-C-, the BIA found that the two groups were not substantially
similar.90 There, the original PSG presented to the IJ was “[s]ingle
Honduran women, age 14 to 30 who are victims of sexual abuse

v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We need not and do not address the BIA’s
legal conclusion that escaped sex slaves are not a protected social group . . . .”); Matter of
A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (BIA 2014) (“The question whether a group is a
‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the Act is a question of law that we review
de novo.”); Ngugi v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 1132, 1137–39 (8th Cir. 2016); Paloka v. Holder,
762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2013) (en
banc); Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2011); Castañeda-Castillo v. Holder,
638 F.3d 354, 362 (1st Cir. 2011); Cruz-Funes v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th
Cir. 2005).
86 Mayorga-Rosa v. Session, 888 F.3d 379, 383 (8th Cir. 2018).
87 See generally id. (rejecting PSG overlooking specific elements).
88 Id. at 384.
89 See id. at 384–85.
90 See Matter of W-Y-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 192 (BIA 2018) (“social group is
substantially different from the one delineated below.”).
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within the family and whom the government fails to protect.”91 The
group presented to the BIA was “Honduran women and girls who
cannot sever their family ties.”92 At first glance, these groups may
seem quite different, but they both share the immutable
characteristics of gender, family ties, childhood status, and
nationality. Moreover, “lack of government protection for women
in Honduras is what makes it so difficult for women to sever family
ties.”93 Nevertheless, the BIA found that they were not substantially
similar.94 Since neither the BIA nor any appellate court has set forth
a test for determining whether two groups are substantially similar,
the determination can be a very subjective analysis that leaves much
to the BIA’s discretion. A more objective test would be whether the
BIA can determine if a PSG is cognizable based on the existing
evidentiary record.
Numerous cases show a longstanding practice of allowing
asylum seekers to reformulate their groups, not only at the
administrative level in an appeal to the BIA, but even at the circuit
court level.95 The BIA and federal courts have frequently
considered these reformulated groups as long as they can analyze
them based on the existing record. For example, in Matter of
Kasinga, an en banc decision on female genital mutilation, the BIA
allowed both parties to reformulate the PSG on appeal, and then
ultimately adopted its own definition of the PSG.96 There, the IJ
analyzed “all tribal women from certain northern tribes” as the

Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
93 Opening Brief for Petitioners at 25, Petitioners v. Sessions, (No. 18 -60115)
(challenging Matter of W-Y-C- and H-O-B-).
94 See Matter of W-Y-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 192.
95 See Hongyok v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 547, 550 (showing reformulation at the circuit
court level, allowing “semantic” revisions to the social group in a circuit court appeal);
Calel-Chitic v. Holder, 333 F. App’x 845, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (allowing the petitioner to
proceed with a particular social group claim in his Fifth Circuit appeal even though he had
never articulated a social group in immigration court); see also Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch,
808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015) (considering but ultimately rejecting a reformulated
social group); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 290 n.3 (3d Cir.
2007) (reformulating the social group by omitting part of the original definition);
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (redefining the social
group as gay men with “female sexual identities”); Lwin v. I.N.S., 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th
Cir. 1998) (refining the social group to be “parents of Burmese student dissidents”).
96 Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996).
91
92
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PSG.97 Before the BIA, Kasinga proposed a PSG defined as
“[Y]oung women of the Tchamba-Kusuntu tribe who are opposed
to the tribal practices of FGM and forced polygamous marriages,
and have no protection against it.”98 The INS proposed a PSG
defined as “Young women of the Tchamba Kunsuntu tribe who are
opposed to FGM.”99 The BIA ultimately adopted its own PSG,
defined as “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who
have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the
practice.”100
In Matter of M-E-V-G-, another important case that defined
the “social distinction” and” particularity” requirements for a PSG,
the BIA remanded the case for further fact-finding, in part because
“the respondent’s proposed particular social group has evolved
during the pendency of his appeal.”101 Most recently, in Matter of
A-B-, the Attorney General himself reformulated the social group.102
There, the applicant had defined the group as “El Salvadoran
women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where
they have children in common.”103 Yet the Attorney General’s
decision addressed “whether, and under what circumstances, being
a victim of a private criminal activity constitutes persecution on
account of membership in a particular social group.”104 Allowing
the Attorney General, but not an asylum seeker, to reformulate a
PSG shows that different rules are being applied to the government
and to litigants. This violates the basic principle that the
government must be held to the same standards as any other litigant
to ensure a fair proceeding.105
Federal court precedents further demonstrate that the BIA
previously allowed reformulation of the PSG at the administrative
See Matter of Kasinga, File No. A73476695 12 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1995).
Resp’t Br. at 31, Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 252 (BIA 2014).
102 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
103 Id. at 343.
104 Id. at 325.
105 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (the Government as a litigant in a denaturalization proceeding
is bound by the same rules which apply to all other litigant); U.S. v. Stinson, 197 U.S. 200,
205 (1905) (“The government is subjected to the same rules respecting the burden of proof,
the quantity and character of evidence, the presumptions of law and fact, that attend the
prosecution of a like action by an individual.”).
97
98
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level. In De Abarca, the First Circuit noted that the IJ had
considered the PSG defined as “mothers of individuals who resist
gang activity,” but the BIA redefined group as “nuclear family” and
analyzed the redefined group.106 In Pirir-Boc, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the Board had changed the applicant’s articulation of the
PSG from “persons taking concrete steps to oppose gang
membership and gang authority” to “those who have taken direct
action to oppose criminal gangs.”107 In Paloka, the Second Circuit
explained that the petitioner had presented three different PSGs to
IJ and merged them into one PSG on appeal to the BIA; she also
refined her PSG on appeal.108 In Pedromo, the court noted that the
original PSG was “women between the ages of 14 and 40 who are
Guatemalan and live in the US,” but the BIA considered a
reformulated PSG of “all women in Guatemala.”109 And in Cece,
the Seventh Circuit stressed that even though “the description of
[the petitioner’s] social group varied from one iteration to the next,”
these “inconsistencies . . . do not upset the claim.”110
In some cases, the BIA considered PSGs that were dramatically
different from those presented to the IJ. For example, in
Hernandez-Navarro, the initial PSG was “individuals in fear of the
violence and gangs in Mexico,” but the PSG presented to the BIA
was “family in Mexico.”111 In Hernandez-Morales, the Sixth
Circuit noted that the BIA had reformulated the PSG from
“individuals enrolled in school in Guatemala who are tall or have a
muscular build so as to command respect resulting in their
recruitment by gangs for their capacity to sell drugs” to “young male
106 De Abarca v. Holder, 757 F.3d 334, 336 (1st Cir. 2014); see also Cardona v.
Sessions, 848 F.3d 519, 520–21 (1st Cir. 2017) (recognizing that the petitioner may change
the definitions of particular social groups between the immigration court and appeal to the
BIA).
107 Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1080 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the
BIA changed the applicant’s articulation of his particular social group).
108 Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2014).
109 Pedromo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010).
110 Cece originally proposed the PSG “young Orthodox women living alone in
Albania.” The IJ changed it to “young women who are targeted for prostitution by
traffickers in Albania. The IJ then revised it a second time to “women in danger of being
trafficked as prostitutes.” After remand, the IJ revised the PSG a third time to “a young
woman from a minority religion who has lived by herself most of the time in Albania, and
thus is vulnerable, particularly vulnerable to traffickers for this reason.” Cece v. Holder,
733 F.3d 662, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2013).
111 Hernandez-Navarro, 605 F. App’x 419, 419–20 (5th Cir. 2015).
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evangelicals.”112 Indeed, there are even cases where the applicant
never defined the PSG before the IJ, yet the BIA considered a PSG
defined for the first time in the administrative appeal.113
These cases indicate that the BIA’s claim in W-Y-C-—that it
lacks the authority to consider a revised PSG—is disingenuous; the
BIA has been doing precisely that for decades. Appellate bodies of
all kinds routinely make legal determinations based on an existing
factual record. Since the question of whether a PSG is cognizable
is a legal determination, the BIA should be able to address it based
on the existing record.
The complexity of the PSG determination, discussed above,
makes it unreasonable to expect litigants to come up with the perfect
definition of the PSG themselves, especially if they are
unrepresented. The vast majority of asylum seekers are detained,
and detained asylum seekers are unlikely to obtain representation.114
A nationwide study of deportation cases found that only 14% of
detained respondents were represented between 2007 and 2012.115
The same study concluded that represented detainees are over ten
times as likely as unrepresented detainees to succeed on the merits
in immigration court.116 Unrepresented detainees have limited
options to pursue their case as law libraries in detention centers
often lack accessible materials, there are language and literacy
barriers, and access to mail and the internet are limited.117 Given
these limitations, imposing an “exact delineation” pleading
Hernandez-Morales v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 443, 444–45 (6th Cir. 2018).
113 See Chen v. Holder, 448 F. App’x 610, 611 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
petitioner had never defined his particular social group before the IJ and then argued that
he was being persecuted for being a ‘government cooperator’” before the BIA).
114 The Trump Administration is expanding the use of immigration detention,
including for asylum seekers. HARV. IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM, THE
IMPACT OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2017) (noting
that in 2014, 77% of all asylum seekers in removal proceedings were held in detention);
Miriam Jordan, Court Blocks Trump Administration from Blanket Detention of Asylum
Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/us/asylumcourt-ruling-detention.html [https://perma.cc/UQ2Z-GWJK].
115 Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2015).
116 Id. at 49.
117 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (USCCR), WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR
ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 42 (2015),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WX5Z-W67R].
112
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requirement on asylum seekers pursuing the PSG ground, and
prohibiting clarification or revision of the PSG in an administrative
appeal, makes little sense.
B. Substantive Constrictions
Not long after the BIA’s decision in Matter of W-Y-C- imposed
the significant procedural limitations on the PSG ground discussed
above, the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- created
two more substantial obstacles. These include restricting entire
categories of PSG claims and imposing a heightened legal standard
for persecution by non-governmental actors
1. Restricting Entire Categories of PSG Claims
The Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- discounts
domestic violence as a valid basis for asylum, along with any cases
involving “gang violence.”118 Additionally, the BIA’s decision in
Matter of L-E-A-, which is currently pending review by the Attorney
General, limits family-based asylum claims.119 This section
examines how these decisions limit domestic violence and familybased asylum claims, which uniquely impact women asylum
seekers.
a. Domestic Violence Related PSG Claims
One of the biggest substantive changes in the area of PSG-based
asylum claims in recent years was former Attorney General
Sessions’s decision to overrule Matter of A-R-C-G-, the only BIA
precedent recognizing a PSG in an asylum case involving domestic
violence.120 As noted above, in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the PSG that
the BIA accepted was “married Guatemalan women who are unable
to leave the relationship.”121 Subsequently, in unpublished
decisions, IJs and the BIA recognized similar groups involving
unmarried women abused by their partners, as well as children
abused by family members.122 Between 2014 and 2018, numerous
women and children were granted asylum in cases involving
See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018).
See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 44–45 (BIA 2017); Matter of L-E-A-,
27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (A.G. 2018).
120 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
121 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014).
122 Id.
118
119
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domestic violence.123
However, in Matter of A-B- the Attorney General overruled
Matter of A-R-C-G-, finding that the BIA’s explanation of how the
proposed PSG satisfied the criteria of social distinction and
particularity was not well reasoned.124 Critically, Matter of A-Bstates that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic
violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors
will not qualify for asylum.”125 This near-blanket rule purports to
exclude entire categories of asylum claims without any
individualized assessment of the facts and circumstances. That
approach conflicts with the longstanding requirement for
individualized determinations of asylum applications.126 In Grace
v. Whitaker, the D.C. District Court rejected this general rule against
asylum claims based on domestic violence and gang violence as
arbitrary and capricious in the context of credible fear interviews.127
The same reasoning supports rejecting the near-blanket rule in
removal proceedings.
b. Family-Related PSG Claims
Another entire category of PSG claims that appears to be under
attack are those based on family. The BIA has long recognized that
family membership may establish a particular social group. This
line of cases dates at least as far back as 1985, when Matter of
Acosta mentioned “kinship ties” as an example of an immutable
characteristic that can define a PSG.128 In recent years, however,
the BIA has limited the use of family as a PSG.
In 2008, the BIA held in Matter of S-E-G- that a group
comprised of “‘family members,’ which could include fathers,
mothers, siblings, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, grandparents,
[and] cousins” of “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to
recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted
membership in the gang” is too amorphous to constitute a

123 See Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–9 (2016).
124 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
125 Id. at 320.
126 See Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SOUTHWESTERN J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2016).
127 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126–27 (D.C. 2018).
128 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
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cognizable particular social group.129
More recently, in 2017, the BIA issued Matter of L-E-A-, a
decision that recognized the longstanding precedents recognizing
family as a PSG but went on to stress that “[n]ot all social groups
that involve family members meet the requirements of particularity
and social distinction.”130 The BIA “agree[d] with the DHS’s
argument that the inquiry in a claim based on family membership
will depend on the degree of the relationships involved and how
those relationships are regarded by the society in question.”131
In Matter of L-E-A-, the BIA concluded the proposed family
qualified as a PSG but affirmed the denial of asylum on the basis
that the applicant had failed to show that his family membership was
at least one central reason for the persecution.132 The BIA explained
that a nexus “often arise[s] in cases where the family status is
connected to another protected ground, particularly where there is a
political motive . . . that it intertwined with or underlies the
dispute.”133 The BIA also reasoned that “the fact that a persecutor
targets a family member simply as a means to an end is not by itself,
sufficient to establish a claim, especially if the end is not connected
to another protected ground.”134 This “means to an end” test is
much more restrictive than a simple “but for” test (i.e. the asylum
seeker would not have been targeted but for the familial
relationship). The “means to an end” test will likely result in the
denial of many family-based claims brought by individuals fleeing
Mexico and Central America. In that context, it is easy for
immigration judges to conclude that gangs and cartels threaten
family members in order to obtain extortion or ransom, to increase
their ranks, or to avoid arrest, all of which may be characterized as
a means to an end.135
While the BIA’s decision did not go so far as to hold that familybased asylum claims require another protected ground to be
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (BIA 2008).
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42–43 (BIA 2017).
131 Id. at 43.
132 Id. at 47.
133 Id. at 45.
134 Id.
135
See Jeffrey S. Chase, Matter of L-E-A-:The BIA’s Missed Opportunity,
JEFFREYSCHASE.COM (June 22, 2017),
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/6/11/matter-of-l-e-a-the-bias-missedopportunity [https://perma.cc/K23D-QM95].
129
130
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involved (i.e. a “double nexus”)—a highly controversial issue—it
suggests that family-based claims are strongest in that situation. A
double nexus would require the applicant to show not only that she
was targeted on account of a family relationship (the PSG) but also
that the family member whose relationship created the risk to the
applicant was targeted on account of a separate protected ground.
In December 2018, Acting Attorney General Whitaker directed
the BIA to refer him Matter of L-E-A- for review of the decision.136
Whitaker stayed the BIA’s decision in Matter of L-E-A- and
requested briefing on “[w]hether, and under what circumstances, an
alien may establish persecution on account of a membership in a
‘particular social group’ . . . based on the aliens’ membership in a
family unit.”137 This phrasing suggests that the Acting Attorney
General was considering whether family may ever be the basis of a
PSG. It is very likely that Whitaker certified the decision to himself
in order to reconsider the double nexus issue. Whitaker has since
been replaced by William Barr as Attorney General,138 but the
future of family-based asylum claims remains uncertain.
2. Applying a Heightened Standard for Persecution by
Non-Governmental Actors
The second substantive change imposed by Matter of A-B- is a
heightened standard for persecution by non-governmental actors.
Although this standard applies to all of the protected grounds, not
just the PSG ground, it uniquely impacts the PSG ground because
cases involving gender-related harm by private actors are often
brought under that ground.139
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 494.
Id. at 494.
138 Attorneys
General of the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/ag/historical-bios [https://perma.cc/3VMW-63M6].
139 See Linda Kelly, “On Account of” Private Violence: The Personal/Political
Dichotomy of Asylum’s Nexus, 21 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 98 (2017) (explaining
that the PSG ground provides “terrific new opportunities for personal violence victims”
but “such optimism is checked by high standards”); Nina Rabin, At the Border between
Public and Private: U.S. Immigration Policy for Victims of Domestic Violence, 7 L. &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 109, 109 (2013); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batters as Agents of the
State: Challenging the Public/Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based
Asylum Claims, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 117, 117 (2013); Hilary Charlesworth, Christine
Chinkin & Shelly Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L.
613, 613 (discussing “a public/private dichotomy based on gender”); Karen Musalo and
Blaine Bokey, Crimes Without Punishment: An Update on Violence Against Women and
136
137
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Under the INA, a noncitizen must show either “past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution” to qualify for
asylum.140 In Matter of Acosta, the BIA recognized that persecution
could be inflicted “either by the government of a country or by
persons or an organization that the government was unable or
unwilling to control.”141 The BIA explained that statutes predating
the Refugee Act of 1980 used the term “persecution,” and that it
already had a well-settled judicial and administrative meaning of
“harm or suffering . . . inflicted either by the government of a
country or by persons or an organization that the government was
unable or unwilling to control.”142 The BIA therefore construed the
INA as carrying forward the same established meaning of the
term.143 Consistent with the BIA’s interpretation in Acosta, the
UNHCR Handbook recognizes that persecution includes “serious
discriminatory or other offensive acts . . . committed by the local
populace . . . if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if
the
authorities
refuse,
or
prove
unable,
to
144
offer effective protection.”
Yet, in Matter of A-B-, the Attorney General imposed a stricter
standard for persecution by non-governmental actors, requiring the
applicant to show that “the government condoned the private
actions or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect
the victim.”145 Under this heightened standard, no asylum seeker
who received assistance from the government, regardless of how
ineffective that assistance was, could meet the persecution
requirement when the persecutor is a non-government actor.146
That interpretation conflicts with numerous appellate court
precedents,147 and, in Grace v. Whitaker, which addressed credible
Impunity in Guatemala, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 265, 265 (2013); Deborah
Anker, Lauren Gilbert & Nancy Kelly, Women Whose Governments Are Unable or
Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify as
Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 709 (1997).
140 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
141 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 223.
144 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 65.
145 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018) (emphasis added).
146 See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 129 (D.C. 2018).
147 See, e.g., Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 159 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that
a petitioner satisfied the “unable or unwilling” standard, even though there was a
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fear interviews, the D.C. District Court found that it is “simply not
the law.”148 To the extent some appellate courts have used the
“condoned” or “complete helplessness” language utilized in Matter
of A-B-, Grace explains that those courts actually applied the
“unable or unwilling” standard despite using different language.149
Reasoning that the “unable or unwilling” standard for nongovernmental persecution was settled at the time the Refuge Act of
1980 was codified in the INA, Grace concluded that the “condoned”
or “complete helplessness” standard in A-B- is not a permissible
construction of persecution.150
Because the decision in Grace pertains specifically to credible
fear interviews, it has no direct impact on cases pending before the
immigration courts or BIA. Thus, immigration courts can continue
to apply the heightened standard in A-B- in removal proceedings.
However, the logic of Grace applies equally to asylum cases in
removal proceedings, as well as to affirmative asylum applications
submitted to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services by
individuals who are not facing deportation. Immigration judges
who apply the heightened standard in A-B- will likely be challenged
on appeal, and the circuit courts that receive those appeals will
ultimately need to address the same issue addressed by Grace.
IV. Implications of Constricting the PSG Ground
The recent developments discussed above have serious
implications for the future of asylum claims based on the PSG
ground. These changes appear targeted at the current populations
fleeing Central America. Policies calling for a “border wall” and
stopping migration from Mexico and Central America go hand-inhand with these administrative decisions making it harder for people
escaping those countries to obtain asylum in the United States.151
But the procedural and substantive changes created by Matter of WY-C- and Matter of A-B- will impact all asylum claims based on the

significant police response to the claimed persecution).
148 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F.Supp. 3d at 129.
149 Id. (discussing Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 955 (7th Cir. 2000)).
150 Id. at 130.
151 See Robert Moore, Border Agents Are Using a New Weapon Against Asylum
Seekers,
TEX.
MONTHLY
(June
2,
2018),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/immigrant-advocates-question-legality-of-latestfederal-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/X9MV-AHCG].

512

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLIV

PSG ground.
In the short term, we are likely to see much higher rates of denial
of asylum claims related to domestic violence, which had become
accepted under Matter of A-R-C-G-, as well as higher rates of
denials in cases involving family-based PSGs, which have been
accepted for decades. We are also likely to see a proliferation of
appeals challenging these new procedural and substantive rules in
the circuit courts, similar to what occurred when the BIA introduced
the social visibility distinction and particularity requirements.
One key difference, however, is that the new procedural rules in
Matter of W-Y-C- should not be subject to Chevron deference.
While the BIA’s decisions addressing social visibility/distinction
and particularity were interpreting the term “particular social group”
in the INA, the procedural rules announced in Matter of W-Y-C- do
not involve statutory interpretation. The BIA is not interpreting the
meaning of a PSG in W-Y-C-; it is adopting procedural rules that are
completely independent of the statute. The appellate courts should
review these new procedural rules de novo, which makes them
much easier to overturn than under the deferential Chevron test.
The substantive changes created by Matter of A-B- and,
depending on the ultimate decision by the Attorney General, Matter
of L-E-A-, on the other hand, do interpret terms in the INA
(“particular social group” and “persecution”) and should therefore
be reviewed under Chevron. Nevertheless, they may well fail that
standard as arbitrary or unreasonable interpretations of the INA.
The D.C. District Court’s decision in Grace provides compelling
rationale for rejecting any type of blanket exclusion of entire
categories of claims and a heightened standard for persecution by
non-governmental actors under step two of Chevron. It is also quite
possible that a circuit split will emerge on these issues, just as
occurred with respect to the social distinction and particularity
requirements. As the PSG analysis becomes increasingly complex
and produces such circuit splits, it will continue to undermine the
uniform and consistent application of asylum law.
This discussion also requires highlighting and contextualizing
the unique impact of the procedural and substantive changes
explained above on gender-related asylum claims. These recent
cases reveal how gender-related asylum claims are being suppressed
in the United States at the same time that the “me too” movement
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has exploded worldwide.152 In fact, Matter of A-B- injects
antiquated notions of domestic violence as “private violence” back
into asylum jurisprudence.153 Describing domestic violence as
“private violence” is wrong for many reasons.154 Scholars such as
Kimberlé Crenshaw have demonstrated how the convergences
between private and public power create intersectional dimensions
of social control.155 Government actors are often complicit in
private violence, allowing public and private forces to work
symbiotically.156 The inadequate response of police to domestic
violence exemplifies this type of symbiosis.157 Additionally,
government actors participate in creating social constructions of
“private life” as something distinct from the public sphere.158 For
all of these reasons, the concept of state responsibility in
international human rights law, which includes refugee law, has
evolved to include obligations to prevent, investigate, and punish
abuses by private actors.159 Attempting to isolate “private violence”
from state action undermines decades of work to show how the
public and private sphere are intertwined and risks forfeiting our
international obligations.
On the other hand, it is possible that by overruling Matter of AR-C-G- and the complicated definition of the PSG that the BIA

152 See Katie Benner and Caitlin Dickerson, Sessions Says Domestic and Gang
Violence Are Not Grounds For Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-domestic-violenceasylum.html [https://perma.cc/FY5U-GJVA].
153 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018).
154 See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batters as Agents of the State: Challenging the
Public/Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 35 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 117, 134–36, 155 (2013).
155 See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration:
Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418
(2012).
156 See Susanne M. Browne, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the
Inadequate Response of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1295, 1307 (1995) (explaining that “[i]n the domestic violence context, the state’s action
combined with private forces may collectively place a battered woman in a worse-off
position, which would not be recognized if the focus was solely upon the state’s actions”).
157 See id. at 1298.
158 See Alice M. Miller and Meghan Faux, Reconceiving Responses to Private
Violence and State Accountability: Using an International Human Rights Framework in
the United States, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 67, 72–73 (1999).
159 See id. at 78.
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accepted in that case (“married women who are unable to leave the
relationship”), former Attorney General Sessions unintentionally
made some immigration judges more open to consider a much
simpler, more logical version of the PSG that has long been
advocated by immigration lawyers and scholars: women.160 In at
least three asylum decisions issued after Matter of A-B-,
immigration judges in Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Arlington
have done just that, finding that gender alone defined the PSG.161
Gender or sex is an immutable characteristic, similar to race,
religion, nationality and political opinion, and also satisfies the
requirements of social distinction and particularity.
In the past, many judges have rejected PSGs defined solely
based on gender or sex out of fear of opening the floodgates. But
fear of opening the floodgates is not a legal reason to reject a PSG.
That fear is also unfounded, since establishing a PSG is just one of
several requirements to qualify for asylum.162 The other elements
an applicant needs to show include a well-founded fear of severe
harm that rises to the level of persecution, a nexus between the
persecution and the PSG, and, in cases involving nongovernmental
persecutors, that the government is unable or unwilling to provide
protection.163 Thus, merely accepting a PSG defined solely by sex
or gender would not render all women fleeing a given country
eligible for asylum.
The most troubling implication of W-Y-C- is the risk to due

160 See Bethany Lobo, Women as a Particular Social Group: A Comparative
Assessment of Gender Asylum Claims in the United States and United Kingdom, 26 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 361 (2012); Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights
Approach, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133 (2002); Deborah E. Anker, Nancy Kelly & John
Wilshire-Carrera, Defining “Particular Social Group” in Terms of Gender: The Shah
Decision and U.S. Law, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1005 (1999); David L. Neal, Women
as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (1988).
161 Jeffrey S. Chase, IJs Grant Gender-Based Asylum Claims, JEFFREYS.CHASE.COM
(Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/1/20/ijs-grant-gender-basedasylum-claims [https://perma.cc/FFL8-HU8N]; see also Decision by Immigration Judge
Miriam Howard in the San Francisco Immigration Court (on file with author); Decision
by Immigration Judge Nadkarni in the Arlington Immigration Court (on file with author).
162 See Jack Herrera, In asylum claims, is domestic abuse ‘private violence’ or a
societal issue?, PAC. STANDARD (Nov. 19, 2018), https://psmag.com/news/in-asylumclaims-is-domestic-abuse-private-violence-or-a-societal-issue [https://perma.cc/2DT269Y2]; 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (2018).
163 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (2018).
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process posed by pretermitting asylum cases without giving
applicants the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. All
noncitizens have a fundamental right to procedural due process in
removal proceedings, which requires a full and fair hearing.164
Noncitizens have due process (and statutory) rights to testify,
present witnesses and documentary evidence, and cross-examine
any witnesses presented by the government.165 Pretermitting
applications based on the failure to provide an “exact delineation”
of the PSG undermines these rights. While there may be cases
where pretermitting an application for asylum is appropriate
because the person is clearly ineligible for that form of relief (for
example, where the noncitizen is statutorily barred from asylum
based on an aggravated felony conviction), the proper definition of
the PSG may only emerge after all the evidence is presented,
including testimony. Thus, pretermitting an asylum case based on
failing to define the PSG perfectly at an early stage of the
proceedings is a dangerous approach.
One of the biggest challenges noncitizens will face when
appealing decisions to pretermit their applications is proving
prejudice from the due process violation. Some circuit courts have
an especially high standard for establishing prejudice, which
requires showing that the outcome of the proceedings would have
been different, not just that they may have been different, if the due
process violation had not occurred.166 Even circuit courts that have
applied a more lenient prejudice standard have previously denied
due process challenges brought by noncitizens when immigration
judges pretermitted cases without a full evidentiary hearing based
on the failure to demonstrate prejudice.167 There are some cases,
See id.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)B) (2018); see also Romanishyn v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d
175, 185 (3d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that due process entitles noncitizens to “a full and
fair hearing and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence”).
166 See, e.g., Ozuna v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F. App’x 733, 736–37 (11th Cir. 2014)
(denying a due process challenge to a decision to pretermit application because the
noncitizen failed to that the outcome would have been different); Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
879 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that the IJ’s decision to pretermit an application
for cancellation of removal did not violate due process, even though the government
delayed filing a motion to pretermit the application until the day of the merits hearing,
because the noncitizen failed to show prejudice).
167 See Zangiat v. Ashcroft, 102 F. App’x 774 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming a decision to
pretermit an asylum application where the failed to obtain relevant documents, reasoning
that she had not shown prejudiced because she had not established that the alleged due
164
165
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however, where courts have found a violation of due process that
resulted in prejudice, stemming from the IJ’s decision to pretermit
an application. For example, in one unpublished case, the Third
Circuit found that an IJ’s refusal to allow an applicant for
cancellation of removal to present additional evidence violated due
process, resulting in prejudice.168 In that case, the noncitizen
actually had an opportunity to testify at a hearing but was denied an
opportunity to present additional evidence at a subsequent hearing
to clarify ambiguity in his prior testimony.169 In cases where the
noncitizen is deprived of any opportunity to testify, the due process
concerns are even greater.
Another complication in bringing due process challenges where
IJs have pretermitted asylum cases is that some courts have found
there is no due process interest in discretionary forms of relief, and
asylum is ultimately discretionary. Courts have been inconsistent
in their approach to this issue. For instance, the Third Circuit found
a due process violation in the case mentioned above, even though
cancellation of removal is discretionary, but in other cases, the Third
Circuit has held there is no constitutionally protected due process
interest in discretionary forms of relief like cancellation of
removal.170 However, other courts have reasoned that even though
discretionary relief such as asylum is not a protected liberty interest,
due process principles apply because noncitizens in removal
proceedings are entitled to a full and fair hearing.171
process violation was “likely to impact the result of the proceedings”); Sosa v. Ashcroft,
76 F. App’x 220, 221 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding no prejudice even under the Ninth Circuit’s
more lenient standard, which allows the court to consider “anything in [the] record from
which we can infer prejudice despite [the noncitizen’s] failure to pinpoint the evidence she
would have presented had she been given the opportunity”); Yeglaryan v. Holder, 500 F.
App’x 583, 585 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Although the IJ pretermitted Yeglaryan’s opportunity to
present evidence regarding his marriage to a U.S. citizen, making the proceeding
incomplete and, therefore, unfair . . . Yeglaryan has not shown prejudice . . .”).
168 Jaimez-Perez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 563 F. App’x 136, 138–39 (3d Cir. 2014).
169 Id.
170 See Turcios-Ocampo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 382 F. App’x 154, 157–58 (3d Cir.
2010); United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 104–05 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that
noncitizens do not have a due process interest in being considered for discretionary relief);
Pinho v. INS, 249 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding change in eligibility criteria for
suspension of deportation, a discretionary form of relief, did not implicate due process
rights); see also Pinos-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 2008); Smith v.
Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 429 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the noncitizen had “no property
or liberty interest in the ‘right’ to discretionary section 212(c) relief”).
171 See Pagoada-Galeas v. Lynch, 659 F. App’x 849, 858 (6th Cir. 2016); Solis-
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V. Conclusion
The recent developments in PSG jurisprudence discussed above
further distance the United States’ interpretation of the PSG ground
from UNHCR’s authoritative interpretations of the Refugee
Convention and Protocol. This backwards slide undercuts the
fundamental human rights protections that these treaties aim to
provide and injects ever greater inconsistencies and uncertainty into
our asylum system.

Umana v. Gonzales, 194 F. App’x 416, 417 (9th Cir. 2006).
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